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
23 October 1972

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Review of Collection from Overt Facilities Abroad

PARTICIPANTS:

25X(1A)



James Q. Reiter, CIA

* Part of the time

1. It was agreed:

a. That the development of a program to identify intelligence information from available sources within the United States, whether classified or unclassified, was of primary concern to CSC, OSI, OCS, and OCD; and

b. That CSC with three offices would devise such a program. While all agreed that this could proceed concurrently with the second project below, it was recognized that correlation between the two was necessary and should be accomplished as each progresses.

2. The problem of possible need for expanded resources for collection from overt sources, or initiation or expansion of CIA collection in this field, has been stated in terms of appraising the adequacy of collection from overt sources abroad. It is recognized that an appraisal of "adequacy" must be in precise terms to be useful. As for CSC, in general, it can meet this problem best by passing with the overt collective instances of no response. For CSC there already exists, in its relation with the State Department, the basis whereby follow-up case by case may be accomplished. In the case of CSC, it is recognized that current discussions with the State Department in reference to NSCID 16 cover this matter.*

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3. A thesis put forward as an ultimate objective is as follows:

CIA's production interests, namely, OSA, OSI, and SCI ought to be recognized in the management of the Foreign Service of the United States in a manner similar to that whereby the current law recognizes the special interests of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. These agencies at one earlier time had their own services abroad for the collection from overt sources. They now sit with the Board of the Foreign Service, an interagency advisory body to the State Department which administers that service. Primarily they are the ones who designate who should be the Agricultural Attaché in the case of Agriculture, etc., and to a considerable extent such attachés are responsive directly to the needs of these agencies, though the channel of communication is through the State Department. It is entirely reasonable, therefore, to expect that nominees of OSA and OSI, in particular, might be attached as members of the Foreign Service to deal with requests peculiar to those offices. It may be in the circumstances for reason of the time of our entry on the scene, the shortage of funds for the administration of the Foreign Service and the availability of funds to the SCI, that CIA might need or wish to pay for these.

4. While the group generally agreed that as a long-range objective this might be adequate and possible, it was believed by some, and in particular by ODD, that immediate action is required to gather in certain materials from abroad which if not sent back to Washington might be lost or which in fact the offices, particularly OSA and OSI, are now seriously in need.

5. The two functions which appear to us in need of improvement at this time are: expanding the resources and the activity of publication procurement officers of the State Department, and detecting and arranging for getting back to Washington documentary material (primarily in Europe at the moment) available from the files of U. S. Government agencies abroad or our Allies. From two needs and possibilities there have emerged most clearly from the ODD microfilm and publications survey of Europe undertaken in the last year. It is apparent that the offices feel that a CIA officer, having in mind OSA and OSI needs, and familiar with the location in Europe of repositories of documentary and published materials, could most effectively meet the need. Such an officer or officers would not be, it is thought, attached to the various embassies. Instead they might have a headquarters at one point, would rove the Continent keeping on the watch for such materials and developing contacts which would lead to identity of such materials. These contacts would be primarily with U. S. Government officials and with foreign officials, the latter contacts being arranged by the Chief of Mission or his designee.

6. ODD will take the initiative in pursuing the problem in paragraph 5 above and in connection with both paragraphs 1 and 3 will keep DDCI/DDB informed so that it may express its views and interests as it seems fit.

JAMES R. REED

Assistant Director

Intelligence Coordination

cc: 38/1

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